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THE CURT FLOOD ACT OF 1998:
THE PLAYERS' PERSPECTIVE
MARIANNE MCGETrIGAN*

Last October 27 the President signed into law the Curt Flood Act of

1998 (CFA). 1 Through its provisions, and the unequivocal statement in
its purpose section that Major League Baseball players have the same
rights under the antitrust laws as do other professional athletes, the CFA
clarifies the law and dispels any notion that baseball players cannot bring
antitrust actions against Major League Baseball owners. At the same
time the CFA ensures that it does not affect the application of the antitrust laws to any other person or entity or in any other context.
Both points were of utmost importance to the players. The first,
although by no means a panacea for all that strains the relationship between owners and players in Major League Baseball, should reduce the
likelihood of work stoppages, something that has plagued the industry
for nearly three decades. But it is the second aspect that is most susceptible to being mischaracterized, misunderstood or overlooked by observers and commentators. Congress was careful to specify that this
legislation says nothing about the application of the antitrust laws except
with regard to the employment of Major League players. Whatever the
law was as to other individuals or circumstances on October 26, 1998, it
remained unchanged on October 28, 1998. As will be discussed below,
this aspect of the bill reflects a significant disagreement between the parties about the extent to which baseball's so-called antitrust exemption
continues to exist.
PROTECTING PLAYERS

The Need
If, in the course of collective bargaining, the Major League Baseball
players and owners bargain to an impasse, labor law permits the owners
to impose unilaterally on the players the terms of the owners' last offer.
* BA, Clark University, 1972; JD, Boston University School of Law, 1975; MPA, Harvard
University, 1989. The author led the congressional lobbying effort on the part of the Major
League Baseball Players Association: Counsel to the law firm of Verrill & Dana, LLP, Portland, Maine 1992-present.
1. The Act was named in honor of the courageous Major League Baseball player, Curt
Flood, who sacrificed his career to fight a system he believed to be a form of involuntary
servitude.
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Unlike traditional unions, the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) does not negotiate the salary of individual players. Thus,
if the owners merely dig in their heels and wait the players out, at the
end of the "waiting" period the owners can impose a structured and
capped salary system, in essence returning to the good old days of absolute control over players that existed before the union won for the players the right to free agency. The desire of the owners to control and cap
salaries cannot be overstated. It has been the tantalizing notion of obtaining such control, and the owners dogged pursuit of that goal, that has
been largely responsible for eight work stoppages in eight rounds of collective bargaining in the last 25 years. Indeed, in the last negotiations,
the owners unilaterally imposed a salary cap which a court order forced
2
the owners to rescind.
In other sports and industries, once such terms and conditions are
imposed, the employees have the right to challenge those terms and conditions under the antitrust laws if they believe those restraints can be
proven to be unreasonably anticompetitive. Because of the nature of
antitrust litigation, and the threat of treble damages, the mere prospect
of such a challenge can serve to moderate the actions of employers and
the content of their bargaining proposals. Such moderation tends to foster negotiated settlements. In so doing, the antitrust laws have worked
well, and served a laudable public purpose. Because the CFA should
eliminate any thought on the part of Major League Baseball owners that,
after impasse, they can impose new terms and conditions of employment
without regard to the antitrust implications, there should be a similar
moderation of actions and proposals in baseball. If so, the stress on
baseball's collective bargaining process should be reduced.
Some may question the need for the CFA in the mistaken belief that
the issue of "free agency" is settled for Major League Baseball, or because they question the utility of the antitrust laws in the labor context
following the recently decided Supreme Court case of Brown v. Pro
Football Inc.' Free agency, that is the right to look for work with more
2. See Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Committee, Inc., 880 F.
Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y.), affd 67 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1995).
3. 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996). In 1989, the NFL adopted a rule to allow every team to establish a "developmental squad" of players who had not made the regular team roster but who
would be available to practice with the players who had. These players were to be paid a
uniform salary, contrary to the situation for all other players. After adopting the rule, the
NFL presented the developmental squad proposal to the union and set a salary of $1,000.00

per week for these players (comparable players in the prior season had received an average of
$4,000.00 per week). The union rejected the proposal and insisted that the developmental
squad players be permitted to bargain individually for their salaries like other players. When
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than one potential employer, came about in baseball as the result of an
arbitrator's interpretation of the provisions of the standard player contract.4 But, because the terms of the standard player contract are always

subject to renegotiation in collective bargaining, absent recourse to the
antitrust laws, free agency is at risk, and has been, every time a Basic
Agreement 5 expires. When combined with the previously held belief of
the owners that their joint actions were not subject to the antitrust laws,
confrontation, not compromise, has been the rule.
As in other circumstances, the utility of the antitrust laws in the context of employee relations lies in their deterrent effect. It is clear that in

providing for treble damages, Congress intended the effectiveness of the
antitrust laws to stem largely from such deterrence. If anticompetitive
behavior is deterred, or even ameliorated, the conduct of parties is necessarily changed. And so it should be with baseball. If the owners are
more wary of imposing potentially anticompetitive terms and conditions
of employment, that will, one would think, increase the likelihood of
negotiating a settlement with the players.

The full import of the Brown case is not yet known. There are questions regarding its application left unanswered by the opinion. Moreover, the potential for the reasoning of the opinion in the context of
sports or, indeed, any industry in which labor is the equivalent of the
negotiations on the proposal reached an impasse, the NFL unilaterally implemented the plan.
The issue before the Court was what protection employers have under the non-statutory exemption when they act together to impose new terms and conditions of employment under the
labor laws. The players asserted that the non-statutory exemption did not protect a proposal
to which the players had not agreed. The owners asserted that as long as a collective bargaining relationship existed, i.e. the union continued to represent the players, even if there was an
impasse, the owners actions could not be attacked under the antitrust laws. The Supreme
Court held that under the facts of the Brown case, because the parties were involved in the
collective bargaining process which included being at impasse, the agreements of the employers (owners) were shielded from an antitrust challenge by the non-statutory exemption to the
federal labor laws. The Court declined to speculate on the outer reaches of the non-statutory
labor exemption, but noted that there were instances "sufficiently distance in time and in
circumstances" from the collective bargaining process that might warrant the application of
the antitrust laws, citing the appellate court's suggestion that forgoing union status or decertifying their union were ways in which players could invoke the protections of the antitrust
laws, rather than the labor laws.
For a thoughtful critique of the appellants' argument in Brown and the suggestion of an
alternative approach to analyzing multiemployer bargaining issues in the sports and entertainment industries see Michael C. Harper, Essay: Multiemployer Bargaining,Antitrust Law, and
Team Sports: The Contingent Choice of a Broad Exemption, 38 WM & MARY L. RFv. 1663
(1997).
4. In other sports it came about as the result of antitrust litigation.
5. The term Basic Agreement refers to the final collective bargaining agreement resulting
from negotiations.
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product, to result in unforseen consequences may be far greater than the
Court has impliedly suggested.6 But the real question is whether the
decision is sufficient to dissuade players from nonetheless seeking recourse to the antitrust laws. There may well be a circumstance in which
the protections of the antitrust laws, even with the stark choice apparently presented by Brown, are seen as preferable to the hollow reality of
a flawed labor law system.
Finally, a strong argument can be made that this legislation was not
really necessary, given recent developments in the law, and that Major
League players could turn to the courts for protection against anticompetitive conduct by the owners. As discussed below, the case of Piazza
v. Major League Baseball,7 invokes the doctrine of stare decisis to determine the extent of any alleged antitrust immunity. Piazza recognizes the
reserve system as the only specific baseball antitrust issue on which the
Supreme Court has ever opined. The Court also invoked the doctrine of
stare decisis in Flood v. Kuhn.' That decision reflects the Court's concern about long standing reliance by the owners on an antitrust immunity in the development of the reserve system. And yet, were a similar
case brought before the Court today, it would be much more difficult for
the owners to claim such reliance given the changes in the system necessitated by the Messersmith/McNally arbitration case, which followed
Flood by just four years, and subsequent collective bargaining. Moreover, it would be interesting to listen to the owners argue reliance on the
reserve system as it existed at the time of Flood, or even the Messersmith/McNally decision, when virtually none of the ownership or management of Major League teams at that time continues in baseball today.
Nonetheless, in addressing the issue of the application of the antitrust
laws to Major League Baseball, practical considerations made litigation
a less appealing remedy for the players than a legislative one. Major
League Baseball players have careers that last, on average, a little more
than four years. Antitrust litigation is complex and lengthy enough as it
is; but here the players would also have had to litigate the threshold
question of whether, or to what extent, the antitrust laws apply-a question surely to result in one of the parties ultimately appealing to the
Supreme Court for a final determination.9 And, following the Brown
6. See Harper, supra note 3.
7. 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
8. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
9. One of the barriers to obtaining further explanation from the Supreme Court of the
application of the antitrust laws to baseball is the paucity of cases that get beyond the trial
court level. If Major League Baseball suffers an adverse decision on an antitrust issue the
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decision, such litigation could well require a player to forego his labor

law rights in order to make an antitrust challenge. Taken together, these
considerations made the pursuit of clarifying legislation the most appropriate, if not appealing, course of action.
The Process
The final and successful push for passage of this clarifying legislation

was, ironically, the result of an agreement reached in collective bargaining. Pending before Congress for several years, the issue of the applica-

tion of the antitrust laws to Major League Baseball became what is
known as a "maturing issue;" i.e. one involving some question of public
policy either previously overlooked, unexplored or deliberately ignored
by Congress. Even when brought to the attention of Congress by a
highly motivated interest group, such a "maturing issue" can require a

process of educating members and developing a record that can take
several years.' 0 Progress comes slowly, but steadily. If things go well,

eventually, usually after some years, a tipping point is reached and the
momentum seems to swing to the advocates of the legislation. When
that happens, although the outcome can be delayed, it can seldom be
avoided.
A recognition of the maturation of this issue on the part of Major

League owners may have been one of several reasons why they agreed
to discuss antitrust clarifying legislation during collective bargaining dis-

cussions. The need to identify something of interest to the players to
trade for something of interest to the owners in collective bargaining, or
the view that the Brown decision reduced the usefulness of the antitrust
laws to the players may also have contributed."
clubs quickly undertake settlement negotiations, virtually always successful ones. Only the
players can reasonably be expected to resist such efforts because, unlike other litigants who
may be legitimately able to quantify their injury, there is no settlement to an antitrust action,
short of free agency, that would be acceptable to players.
10. Other examples of maturing issues include civil rights legislation, including most recently, disability rights legislation (the Americans with Disabilities Act); a federal product
liability law (legislation first proposed in the early 1980s, often lingering in committee is now
repeatedly debated on the Senate floor restrained only by filibuster); and the Brady bill, requiring a waiting period for the purchase of a handgun.

11. The text of Article XXVIII of the BASIC

AGREEMENT

contains within it evidence of a

quid pro quo for support of the legislation; reference is made to a change in the termination
date of the contract if the legislation is not passed in the 105th Congress. Prior agreements
terminated on December 31 of the final year. Because of the passage of the Curt Flood Act,
the current agreement will terminate on October 31 of its final year. The seemingly innocuous
change in the termination date to October 31 has been sought by the owners for several years
because of its relationship to the rest of the off-season baseball calendar.
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Whatever the reason, the owners finally acquiesced, and became participants in the legislative process. In return for their promise to support2
legislation, the termination date of the Basic Agreement was changed.'
Article XXVIII of the current Basic Agreement addresses this issue and
reads as follows:
The Clubs and the Association will jointly request and cooperate
in lobbying the Congress to pass a law that will clarify that Major
League Baseball Players are covered under the antitrust laws (i.e.
that Major League Players will have the same rights under the
antitrust laws as do other professional athletes, e.g. football and
basketball players), along with a provision that makes it clear that
the passage of the bill does not change the application of the antitrust laws in any other context or with respect to any other person
or entity. If such a law is not enacted by December 31, 1998 (the
end of the next Congress), then this Agreement shall terminate
on December 31, 2000 (unless the Association exercises its option
to extend this Agreement as set forth in Article XXVII).
After the Basic Agreement was signed by the parties in March 1997,
the owners and players negotiated the terms of a bill that would fulfil the
mutual promises contained in Article XXVIII. That bill, S. 53, was relatively straight forward and clean. It passed the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 31, 1998.'1
Following the Senate Judiciary Committee's vote, the minor league
owners finally entered the process, having declined many previous invitations to do so.' 4 They used their individual and collective political
clout in the House of Representatives to threaten to block the enactment of the legislation unless the language was changed to their satisfaction. 15 Although the Major League owners, the players and a majority
12. The change in the termination date may play a part in the players consideration of
whether to exercise the option to extend the contract one additional year. If that option is
exercised, the owners will also receive the contents of an escrow account that contains that
portion of the proceeds of certain post season games representing the difference between sixty
and eighty percent of the proceeds. If the players do not exercise the option, they receive the
proceeds of the escrow account.
13. Four members of the Committee offered an amendment they thought would protect
the minor leagues. Although adopted by the Committee, it was dropped in later negotiations.
14. Although complaining about being excluded from the process, the minor leagues
failed to attend a hearing held prior to the Committee's vote for the very purpose of examin-

ing their concerns.
15. Because there are approximately 170 teams in the affiliated minor league system,
many of the members of the House have minor league teams in their districts. The minor
leagues took the position that passage of a bill addressing the application of the antitrust laws
to Major League Baseball employment issues would require many minor league teams to
move or would cause the demise of a large number of teams. Though such claims are highly
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of the Judiciary Committee thought that the minor leagues were well
protected by the bill as it passed the Committee, the owners and players
agreed to negotiate new language with the affiliated minor leagues.' 6
After much prodding and guidance from Senators Hatch and Leahy, the
result was the Curt Flood Act of 1998.11 Although the Act is far from
the clean, concise language that passed the Committee, it does accomplish the twin goals essential to the players, that there be no question
that Major League players have the protection of the antitrust laws and
that the CFA have no affect on the application of the antitrust laws to
any other persons or entities or in any other circumstances.
MAINTAINING THE LAW FOR OTHERS

Unfortunately, there has been too little examination or reexamination of the status of the application of the antitrust laws to Major League
Baseball, or the legal underpinnings for baseball's asserted broad immunity, since the Flood decision.' Because of the constant and effective
repetition by the owners of the claim that they enjoy a broad antitrust
immunity, many people, including some judges, accept it as true, while
others, including members of the press, simply repeat the assertion
rather than explain that opinions on the state of the law differ.'
It is unnecessary to recite a lengthy historical review of the case law
which has been the underpinning of the Major League Baseball owners'
speculative at best, no member of the House would risk being held responsible for such a

result.
16. Affiliated minor league teams are those who have a contractual relationship with a
Major League team. In recent years, many independent teams and leagues have begun
operations.
17. The text of the negotiated bill was offered as a substitute for S.53 on the Senate floor.
It passed by unanimous consent. The bill then went to the House where it also passed by
unanimous consent.
18. Although many presume a blanket exemption for all activities, courts have announced
certain parameters to any exemption noting for example that the exemption applies only to
"the business of baseball" insofar as that business involves activities that are central to the
"unique characteristics and needs" of baseball. Postema v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, 799 F. Supp. 1475, 1488 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258,
282 (1972)), rev'd on other grounds, __ F.2d __ (2nd Cir. July 6, 1993) (exemption does not
apply to baseball's action with respect to umpires); see also, Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v.
Houston Sports Ass'n, 541 F. Supp. 236 (S.D. Tx. 1982) (exemption does not apply to local
radio broadcasting).
19. At least one member of the press, understanding the legal arguments and the deliberate neutrality of the Act, nonetheless mimicked the owners characterization of the Act as
preserving a broad exemption. When asked by the author why he did so, he responded that it
was easier for the public to understand and it was too much trouble to explain the difference
of opinion as to the remainder, if any, of an antitrust immunity.
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assertions that they can act without reference to, or concern about, the
antitrust laws of the United States and the individual states.2 It is
enough to note that the owners assert that they enjoy a judicially created
antitrust immunity which is virtually absolute. As the storm clouds of
the 1994 collective bargaining battle were looming, however, a significant decision, in the form of the denial of a motion to dismiss, was issued
in the Piazza case, then pending in the federal district court for the East-

ern District of Pennsylvania.
In what other courts have identified as an extremely well reasoned
decision, one which denied the defendant Major League owners' motion
to dismiss on the basis of antitrust immunity, the Piazza court engaged
in the most insightful and thoughtful review of the Major League Baseball's alleged antitrust immunity since FederalBaseball in 1922. In analyzing the continuing significance of the Supreme Court's decisions, the
Piazza court turned its attention to the doctrine of stare decisis. Following the reasoning in Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,21
the judge identified two distinct aspects of stare decisis. The doctrine
binds courts either by requiring adherence to the rule of law set forth in
the prior case (rule stare decisis), or by requiring adherence only to the
result (result stare decisis).

20. To quickly summarize, however, the exemption was created through an odd Supreme
Court case known as FederalBaseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). That case arose from the demise of the Federal
Baseball League which had competed with the preexisting American and National Leagues in
1914 and 1915.
After the Federal League folded, the Baltimore Terrapins of the Federal League sued Major League Baseball claiming conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.
Those violations were apparently proven at trial as the plaintiff obtained a damage award in
the amount of $80,000.00 which was appropriately trebled to $240,000.00. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia later overturned the judgment, holding that the Sherman
Act was not applicable. Thereafter, in what many regard as the weakest point of his distinguished judicial career, Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing for the Supreme Court in 1922, held
that exhibitions of baseball, "which are purely state affairs," did not involve interstate commerce and, therefore, the business of producing such exhibitions was not subject to the antitrust laws.
This unfortunate decision was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in a one-paragraph per
curiam opinion in the case of Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953). The Court
relied entirely on the failure of Congress, in 30 years, to change the result in FederalBaseball.
Finally, relying once more upon the "affirmative inaction" of Congress, as well as the rule of
stare decisis, the Supreme Court again upheld the exemption in the case of Flood v. Kuhn, 407
U.S. 258 (1972). In the majority opinion in Flood, the Court described the exemption as "an
anomaly" and "an aberration confined to baseball. .. ."
21. 947 F.2d 682, (3rd Cir. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds,505 U.S.
833, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
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In reviewing Flood, to determine its scope and binding effect, the
judge also noted it had two key components. First, the issue before the
Court in Flood, as in its previous considerations of the application of the
antitrust laws to baseball, was simply the question of the application of
the antitrust laws to the reserve clause. No other activities of Major
League Baseball were involved. Second, the Court in Flood expressly
repudiated the reasoning that was the underpinning of Federal Baseball

and its progeny.22
Finding that Flood had overruled the rule of the Federal Baseball
case, i.e that the business of baseball does not involve interstate com-

merce, Judge Padova concluded that he was bound only by the result in
Flood. Because that result dealt only with the reserve clause, and the
issue in Piazza had nothing to do with the reserve clause, the motion to
dismiss the case on the basis of baseball's alleged antitrust immunity was
denied? 3 After the court refused to certify the case for interlocutory
appeal, the case was settled.
The reasoning of the district court in Piazza has since been adopted
by other courts.2 4 In the same way in which the application of the antitrust laws to baseball in the legislative context was a maturing one, so
too, is it a maturing one in a judicial context. Although the reasoning of
22. Specifically, the Court in Flood held at page 282 of the decision that:
1. Professional baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstatecommerce.
2. With its reserve system enjoying exemptionfrom the federal antitrustlaws, baseball is,
in a very distinct sense, an exception and an anomaly. Federal Baseball and Toolson
have become an aberration confined to baseball.
3. Even though others might regard this as "unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical," the
aberration is an established one..., heretofore deemed fully entitled to the benefit of
stare decisis, and one that has survived the Court's expanding concept of interstate
commerce....
4. Other professional sports operating interstate-football, boxing, basketball, and,
presumably, hockey and golf-are not so exempt.
5. The Court has emphasized that since 1922 baseball, with full and continuing congressional awareness, has been allowed to develop and to expand unhindered by federal legislative action... The Court accordingly has concluded that Congressas yet has
had no intention to subject baseball's reserve system to the reach of the antitrust statutes.... (Emphasis supplied.)
23. The Piazza case had nothing to do with the reserve clause. The case arose out of the
effort by Vincent Piazza, the father of then minor league player Mike Piazza, and his friend,
Vincent Tirendi to participate in a group trying to purchase the San Francisco Giants with the
intent of moving the franchise to Tampa Bay.
24. See Minnesota Twins v. Minnesota, No. 62-CX-568 (Minn. Dist. Court, 2d Jud. Dist.,
Ramsey County April 20, 1998) (reprintedin 1998-1 Trade Cases (CCH) Paragraph 72, 136);
Butterworth, etc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, et al., 644 So. 2d 1021
(1994); Morsani v. Vincent et al, 663 So. 2d 653 (Ct. App. Fl. 1995).
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the Piazza case has been found compelling by many who seriously study
it, some lower courts may be loathe to take action which they believe
might be construed as overruling a Supreme Court decision. But if the
premise of the Piazza case is correct, i.e., that the Supreme Court's prior
review has been limited to the reserve clause, Flood would not be overruled by applying the antitrust laws to Major League Baseball in any
case in which the reserve clause is not the issue.
Judge Padova, in Piazza, did more than just refuse to dismiss an antitrust case against Major League Baseball. Indeed, he unwound the knot
of confused reasoning that has dissuaded others from reassessing the
true status of the law. Because of the Supreme Court's silence, and to a
lessor extent that of Congress, there is currently no generally accepted
understanding of the scope or true nature of the application of the antitrust laws to Major League Baseball32 Even before Piazza, lower court
decisions have demonstrated that fact with respect to a number of antitrust issues having nothing to do with the reserve clause.26 Unfortunately, as far as this writer is aware, since Flood, every antitrust case
against Major League Baseball that has survived a motion to dismiss, has
been settled. Thus, the Supreme Court has had no opportunity to clarify
the meaning of Flood. But, gradually, courts and commentators are
studying Piazza with a seemingly growing appreciation of its thoughtful
analysis.
All of which squarely poses the question which Congress, in the
CFA, expressly chose to leave unaddressed. Although the Major League
Baseball owners may continue to assert that they enjoy the broadest possible antitrust immunity, if Piazza is good law, and the MLBPA believes
it is, then the CFA is the final piece of the puzzle. 7 In other words, if
Piazza is good law, now all the actions of Major League Baseball owners
are subject to the antitrust laws. The owners, of course, are far from
25. Interpreting congressional silence as affirmance of the Supreme Court's reasoning can
be vastly overrated. It may be the result of something as simple as the lack of an advocacy
group with sufficient resources to pursue the issue in Congress, other pending issues that have
the potential to affect larger numbers of individuals or the triumph of an appeal to the "sport"
at the expense of the very real business involved.
26. See supra, note 19, and accompanying text.
27. Some might argue that the minor league system is not yet a part of the completed
puzzle, and the minor leagues certainly would, but under the doctrine of "result stare decisis"
the only issue before the Court in Flood was the Major League reserve system. If that view is
accepted, the antitrust laws apply to the minor leagues just as they do to the ownership issues
in Piazza. Alternatively, the freedom with which the minor league system has been changed
internally and in its relation to Major League Baseball, calls into question whether a reliance
argument is well-taken.
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ready to admit that Piazza is, or should be, the law. It was the recognition of this fundamental dispute about the status of the law that
prompted Congress to leave the application of the law to other persons
or entities and in other contexts unchanged. Thus, the statute expressly
states that no one else's rights are affected.' Congress has neither endorsed nor repudiated Piazza or any other case law; the application of
the antitrust laws to baseball in other areas will continue to be developed
case-by-case.
As stated previously, even if the majority of lower courts hearing antitrust cases against Major League Baseball adopt the reasoning of Piazza, the manner in which antitrust litigation develops in baseball raises
a substantial question as to whether the Supreme Court will ever have
another opportunity to review the application of the antitrust laws to
Major League Baseball. 9 This is unfortunate, because any claim by
baseball owners, which now include such corporations as Fox, Disney,
Nintendo, Microsoft, the Chicago Tribune and Time-Warner, that it
would be an undue hardship to play by the same rules of law as NFL
owners or, indeed, as the local grocery store, is absurd. In all other areas
of business, these corporations have been the beneficiaries of competition. They know how to compete, to do so fairly, and know how to inyoke the antitrust laws to maintain that fair competition; the business of
baseball should be no different. Thanks to the Curt Flood Act of 1998,
at least it is now no different with regard to the employment of Major
League Baseball Players.

28. The necessity to preserve the rights of those who would challenge the assertion of a
baseball antitrust exemption was cited both in the Senate and House debate accompanying
passage of the bill. Specifically, Minnesota Twins, was mentioned in both Houses as a case that
would be unaffected by passage of the Curt Flood Act of 1998.
29. One reason the owners may have finally agreed to this legislation is the security of
knowing that the group most likely to seek review of the antitrust exemption issue by the
Supreme Court has had its rights clarified and needs met. It remains to be seen if there is any
other person or group who will be willing to take the antitrust exemption all the way to the
Court.

